

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA  
CLARKSBURG**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,**

Plaintiff,

vs.

**ADAM LINCH,**

Defendant.

**Case No.: 1:15CR89  
(KEELEY)**

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION  
CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY IN FELONY CASE**

This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge by the District Court for purposes of conducting proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Defendant, Adam Linch, in person and by counsel, William L. Pennington, appeared before me on October 22, 2015. The Government appeared by Assistant United States Attorney, Shawn Michael Adkins. The Court determined that Defendant was prepared to enter a plea of "Guilty" to Count One (1) of the Indictment.

The Court proceeded with the Rule 11 proceeding by first placing Defendant under oath and inquiring into Defendant's competency. The Court determined Defendant was competent to proceed with the Rule 11 plea hearing and cautioned and examined Defendant under oath concerning all matters mentioned in Rule 11.

The Court next inquired of Defendant concerning his understanding of his right to have an Article III Judge hear the entry of his guilty plea and his understanding of the difference between an Article III Judge and a Magistrate

Judge. Defendant thereafter stated in open court that he voluntarily waived his right to have an Article III Judge hear his plea and voluntarily consented to the undersigned Magistrate Judge hearing his plea. Defendant tendered to the Court a written Waiver of Article III Judge and Consent to Enter Guilty Plea before Magistrate Judge. The waiver and consent was signed by Defendant, countersigned by Defendant's counsel, and concurred by the signature of the Assistant United States Attorney.

Upon consideration of the sworn testimony of Defendant, as well as the representations of his counsel and the representations of the Government, the Court finds that the oral and written waiver of an Article III Judge and consent to enter a guilty plea before a Magistrate Judge was freely and voluntarily given. Additionally, the Court finds that the written waiver and consent was freely and voluntarily executed by Defendant Adam Linch only after having had his rights fully explained to him and having a full understanding of those rights through consultation with his counsel, as well as through questioning by the Court. The Court **ORDERED** the written Waiver and Consent to Enter Guilty Plea before a Magistrate Judge filed and made part of the record.

Thereafter, the Court determined that Defendant's plea was pursuant to a written plea agreement, and asked the Government to tender the original to the Court. The Court asked counsel for the Government if the agreement was the sole agreement offered to Defendant. The Government responded that it was, and counsel for Defendant confirmed the same. The Court asked counsel for the

Government to summarize the written plea agreement. Defendant stated that the agreement as summarized by counsel for the Government was correct and complied with his understanding of the agreement. The undersigned further inquired of Defendant regarding his understanding of the written plea agreement. Defendant stated he understood the terms of the written plea agreement and also stated that it contained the whole of his agreement with the Government and no promises or representations were made to him by the Government other than those terms contained in the written plea agreement. The Court **ORDERED** the written plea agreement filed.

The undersigned then reviewed with Defendant Count One (1) of the Indictment and the elements the Government would have to prove, possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a Misdemeanor Domestic Violence in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(9) and 922(a)(2). Subsequently, Defendant Mr.Linch pled **GUILTY** to the charge contained in Count One (1) of the Indictment. However, before accepting Defendant's plea, the undersigned inquired of Defendant's understanding of the charge against him, inquired of Defendant's understanding of the consequences of him pleading guilty to the charge, and obtained the factual basis for Defendant's plea.

The Court heard the testimony of Government witness, Agent Kenneth Peck, from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Agent Peck testified that an investigation into Defendant for the illegal possession of firearms commenced after the Clarksburg Police Department conducted a vehicle stop on Defendant's

vehicle. The vehicle search occurred on March 20, 2015, in Clarksburg, West Virginia. During the vehicle stop, Sergeant Quinn from the Clarksburg Police Department deployed a K-9 service dog to conduct an exterior sniff of the vehicle, upon which the K-9 was alerted and the vehicle subsequently searched. Sergeant Quinn located a HS Products Pistol, Model XD45, .45 caliber, serial number XD622746, and (11) .45 caliber pistol cartridges. Agent Peck further testified regarding Defendant's prior domestic battery conviction from February 11, 2010, in the Magistrate Court of Harrison County, West Virginia, which bars him from legally possessing a firearm. Agent Peck concluded his testimony by establishing the nexus between the firearm found in Defendant's vehicle and interstate commerce.

Neither counsel for Defendant nor Defendant had any questions for the witness. Defendant stated he heard, understood, and did not disagree with Agent Peck's testimony. The undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes the offense charged in Count One (1) of the Indictment is supported by an independent basis in fact concerning each of the essential elements of such offense, and that independent basis is provided by Agent Peck's testimony.

The undersigned then reviewed with Defendant the statutory penalties applicable to an individual adjudicated guilty of the felony charge contained in Count One (1) of the Indictment and the impact of the sentencing guidelines on sentencing in general. From said review, the undersigned Magistrate Judge determined Defendant understood the nature of the charge pending against him and that the possible statutory maximum sentence which could be imposed upon his conviction

or adjudication of guilty on Count One (1) was imprisonment for a period of 10 years. The undersigned further determined Defendant understood a fine of not more than \$250,000.00 could be imposed, both fine and imprisonment could be imposed, he would be subject to a period of at least three (3) years of supervised release, and the Court would impose a special mandatory assessment of \$100.00 for the felony conviction payable on or before the date of sentencing. Defendant also understood that his sentence could be increased if he had a prior firearm offense, violent felony conviction, or prior drug conviction. He also understood he might be required by the Court to pay the costs of his incarceration, supervision, and probation.

The undersigned asked Defendant whether he understood that if he were not a citizen of the United States, by pleading guilty to a felony charge he would be subject to deportation at the conclusion of any sentence; that he would be denied future entry into the United States; and that he would be denied citizenship if he ever applied for it. Defendant stated that he understood.

The undersigned also reviewed with Defendant his waiver of appellate and collateral attack rights. Defendant understood that he was waiving his right to appeal his conviction and sentence to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on any ground whatsoever, including those grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Defendant further understood that under his plea agreement, he was waiving his right to challenge his conviction and sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including any proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Defendant understood,

however, that he was reserving the right to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct that he learned about after the plea hearing and agreed that he was unaware of any ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct in his case at this time. From the foregoing, the undersigned determined that Defendant understood his appellate rights and knowingly gave up those rights pursuant to the conditions contained in the written plea agreement.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge further examined Defendant relative to his knowledgeable and voluntary execution of the written plea bargain agreement, and determined the entry into said written plea bargain agreement was both knowledgeable and voluntary on the part of Defendant.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge further inquired of Defendant, his counsel, and the Government as to the non-binding recommendations and stipulations contained in the written plea bargain agreement and determined that Defendant understood, with respect to the plea bargain agreement and to Defendant's entry of a plea of guilty to the felony charge contained in Count One (1) of the Indictment. The undersigned Magistrate Judge informed Defendant that he would write the subject Report and Recommendation and would further order a pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the probation officer attending the District Court. The undersigned advised the Defendant that the District Judge would adjudicate the Defendant guilty of the felony charged under Count One (1) of the Indictment. Only after the District Court had an opportunity to review the pre-

sentence investigation report, would the District Court make a determination as to whether to accept or reject any recommendation or stipulation contained within the plea agreement or pre-sentence report. The undersigned reiterated to Defendant that the District Judge may not agree with the recommendations or stipulations contained in the written agreement. The undersigned Magistrate Judge further advised Defendant, in accord with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, that in the event the District Court Judge refused to follow the non-binding recommendations or stipulations contained in the written plea agreement and/or sentenced him to a sentence which was different from that which he expected, he would not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant and his counsel each acknowledged their understanding and Defendant maintained his desire to have his guilty plea accepted.

Defendant also understood that his actual sentence could not be calculated until after a pre-sentence report was prepared and a sentencing hearing conducted. The undersigned also advised, and Defendant stated that he understood, that the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and that, even if the District Judge did not follow the Sentencing Guidelines or sentenced him to a higher sentence than he expected, he would not have a right to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant further stated that his attorney showed him how the advisory guideline chart worked but did not promise him any specific sentence at the time of sentencing. Defendant stated that he understood his attorney could not predict or promise him what actual sentence he would receive from the sentencing judge at the

sentencing hearing. Defendant further understood there was no parole in the federal system, but that he may be able to earn institutional good time, and that good time was not controlled by the Court, but by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Defendant, Adam Linch, with the consent of his counsel, William L. Pennington proceeded to enter a verbal plea of **GUILTY** to the felony charge in Count One (1) of the Indictment.

Upon consideration of all of the above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea; Defendant is aware of and understood his right to have an Article III Judge hear and accept his plea and elected to voluntarily consent to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge hearing his plea; Defendant understood the charge against him, not only as to the Indictment as a whole, but in particular as to Count One (1) of the Indictment; Defendant understood the consequences of his plea of guilty, in particular the maximum statutory penalty to which he would be exposed for Count One (1); Defendant made a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to Count One (1) of the Indictment; and Defendant's plea is independently supported by Agent Peck's testimony which provides, beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of each of the essential elements of the charge to which Defendant has pled guilty.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge therefore recommends Defendant's plea of guilty to Count One (1) of the Indictment herein be accepted conditioned upon the Court's receipt and review of this Report and Recommendation.

The undersigned further directs that a pre-sentence investigation report be




prepared by the adult probation officer assigned to this case.

Any party may, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, file with the Clerk of the Court written objections identifying the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis for such objection. A copy of such objections should also be submitted to the Honorable Irene M. Keeley, United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections to the Report and Recommendation set forth above will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of this Court based upon such report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to counsel of record.

Respectfully submitted on October 26, 2015



MICHAEL JOHN ALOI  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE